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 1. INTRODUCTION
      This is an essay on what Michael Scriven termed “probative logic” in a
keynote address at the first ISSA conference in Amsterdam thirteen years ago.
Probative logic is, for Scriven, the logic of probative inference, and these are
inferences “of a kind that is neither deductive nor quantitatively probabilistic,
but, thoughtful people normally believe, properly thought of as strongly
persuasive to the rational faculty” (1987: 9). One is reminded of J.S. Mill’s
characterization, in Chapter 1 of Utilitarianism, of his proof of the principle of
utility, which, he said “cannot be proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of
the term.” Instead, what he proposed to provide are, “Considerations . . .
capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the
doctrine;” and, Mill added: “this is equivalent to proof” (Mill 1861: 4-5). [William
K. Frankena, in lectures, noted the significance of this passage in
Utilitarianism.]
      This topic is central to informal logic—one might even say definitive of it.
That there are good arguments which use reasoning that is neither deductive
nor scientifically inductive has been a guiding conviction of many who work in
this field. It underlies the search for other criteria of good arguments that
produced the Acceptability, Relevance and Sufficiency criteria Johnson and
Blair introduced (1977). Trudy Govier recognized its significance when she
drew attention to conductive inference and case-by-case reasoning in the early
1980s (1980a, 1980b, 1987). Much more recently, Douglas Walton, is taking
up this topic under a different name in his study of presumptive reasoning
(1996). There are probably many others who should be mentioned, but the
reference to Govier’s and Walton’s work will provide a sense for the project of
the present essay.
      The paper is divided into two parts. Section 2 introduces a number of
terminological conventions, and explains what motivates the paper. Section 3
contains the main business of the paper: the analysis of the concept of a
reasoning scheme and the sketch of  a theory of normative reasoning schemes
 2. PRELIMINARIES
 2.1 Terminology
      2.1.1 ‘Reasons’
      It will avoid some possible confusion to talk about “reasons” instead of
“premises” or “arguments.” A reason is here taken to be a unit of support for a
position, taking a “position” to be an attitude towards a proposition,
understanding ‘proposition’ broadly, to include action or policy
recommendations or evaluations as well as what is expressed by (strictly true
or false) declarative sentences. For example, with respect to the proposition,
<The Lewinsky affair weakened the American presidency> any number of
positions is possible: “The Lewinsky affair weakened the American
presidency,” “The Lewinsky affair probably weakened the American
presidency,” “It is doubtful that the Lewinsky affair weakened the American
presidency,” “It is a shame that the Lewinsky affair weakened the American
presidency,” and so on. (The chevrons “< >” bracket a proposition that is
mentioned but not asserted; the quotation marks bracket an assertion or
possible assertion). A person’s reason for a position is a consideration that
the person takes to support it. A person’s reason is a proposition, or a set of
propositions, that the person takes to be true (or otherwise acceptable) and to
lend support to a position. [While I’m not sure that Freeman (1991) would
agree entirely with my stipulation, he does seem to me to use ‘reason’ in a
similar if not identical way (see, for example, p. 94 and p. 96).]
      A reason may support (or be purported to support) a position, by doing (or
being purported to do) any of the following: demonstrate or prove the position
(that is, establish that it must be true); show that the position is probable to
some degree; or show that the position is plausible to some degree (that there
is a presumption of some degree in its favour).
      A person may have more than one reason for a position. In the case of
reasons that logically entail positions (in the sense that, if the reason is true the
position cannot be false), more than one would be redundant; but people can
and do have redundant support for positions. In the case of reasons that
constitute empirical evidence or that supply presumptive support, it is often
appropriate to have more than one reason for a position, since in that case
more reasons can mean stronger support.
      Still, a single reason provides at least some measure of support for a
position. A “single” reason may include more than one proposition. What is the
difference between a single, multi-propositional reason and two or more
reasons? A single reason is the smallest amount of information that by itself
lends some measure of credence to a position.
      Here are some examples of possible reasons supporting positions:
      (1) S’s reason: The rules prevent the game from ending in a draw.
               S’s position: If the game ends, one side in the game must lose. 
     (2) S’s reason: 90 of the 100 balls in the urn are black, ten are white, and
the balls in the urn have been thoroughly mixed.
          S’s position: If anyone reaches into the urn and without looking takes
out a ball, it is highly probable that this ball will be black, not white.
      (3) S’s reason: Sheila told Ed she would treat him to dinner.
               S’s position: Sheila should treat Ed to dinner. 
     (4) S’s reason: If the city council gives special recognition of a “day” for
Immigrants from Iceland, it will have to do the same for virtually any
group that applies, and it is likely that hundreds of other groups would
then apply. The result would be a special recognition “day” every day,
and even special recognition “days” shared by more than one group,
which would defeat the purpose of special recognition.
S’s position: The city council shouldn’t give special recognition of a
“day” for Immigrants From Iceland.
      2.1.2 ‘Argument’ and ‘reasoning’
      In the informal logic and argumentation literature the terms ‘argument’ and
‘reason’ (and their cognates) are used loosely. Walton is a typical example. He
titles the book discussed in this paper, “Argumentation Schemes for
Presumptive Reasoning” (1996), suggesting a connection, and throughout that
book he slips back and forth between referring to “argumentation” schemes
and “reasoning” schemes, as if argumentation and reasoning were identical.
Clearly, they are not (and to be fair, Walton does not claim they are, though he
does not address their connection). Scriven is another example: he calls one of
his books Reasoning (1976), and the book is about analyzing and evaluating
arguments. Yet another is Feldman, whose textbook, Reasons and Argument,
begins with the sentence, “This book presents a method for understanding and
evaluating arguments” (1999: 1). Or again, see Groarke, Tindale and Fisher,
who write in their introduction to Good Reasoning Matters!: “This book is
designed to help you [the student] to improve your reasoning skills. . . . It is our
hope that you will become proficient not only at assessing the arguments you
encounter, but also at constructing arguments of your own” (1997: xiii-xiv). For
these authors, none of whom address the connection, the relation between
reasoning and argument is close and unproblematic. However, reasoning is
not arguing; moreover there are at least two significantly different senses of
‘argument’ in play in these works. [For those familiar with it, I am not here
referring to Daniel O’Keefe’s classical distinction between argument1 and
argument2; rather, I am making a distinction between two senses of argument1
(see O’Keefe, 1977, 1982).]               
      When a person reasons, she infers or draws inferences. She may, like
Harman’s “Mary” (1986: 1), change her view in the process, but not
necessarily, for she may, by reasoning, confirm an already-held view. In either
case she draws a conclusion, that is, takes (or reaffirms) a position, on the
basis of certain grounds that she accepts and takes to support it. The set of
reasons that in her judgement supports a position is, in philosophical literature,
standardly called her “argument” for the position , although she has not argued
at all. Thus, for example, if Mary reasons that since she is out of eggs and
plans to make a soufflé tonight, she should buy eggs today, philosophers will
describe her reasoning as consisting of the following “argument”: “Premise 1: ‘I
am out of eggs’; Premise 2: ‘I plan to make a soufflé tonight’; Premises 3 and
4 (unexpressed): ‘Eggs are needed to make a soufflé and the best way for me
to get eggs is to buy them’; Conclusion: ‘I should buy eggs today.’” Let us call
this the Philosophers’ (or the Propositional) sense of argument, or a P-
argument, and emphasize that its use does not entail the occurrence of any
action or activity that could be called arguing. One has to imagine eccentric
scenarios to come up with a context in which Mary, in her circumstances, might
argue that she should buy eggs today. When Mary proposes reasons to others
as grounds that support a position, inviting them to accept it on those grounds
or trying to persuade or convince them to accept it on those grounds, then she
is engaged in the activity of arguing (see Pinto 1995). In order to argue, one
must communicate with others. Let us call the grounds that Mary proposes to
others for accepting a position her Speech-act argument, or an SA-argument.
Notice that Mary’s SA-argument for a position might be different from her P-
argument for it. The reasons she offers to others might or might not be her
reasons, but they will be reasons she thinks others will embrace as their own—
reasons they will take to support the position she is putting forward. In what
follows I will use ‘argument’ exclusively to denote SA-arguments, and ‘reasons’
or ‘reasoning’ to denote P-arguments.
      Thus an argument (an SA-argument) consists of one or more reasons for
endorsing a position offered by an arguer normally to one or more other people
(an “audience”), but sometimes also to herself. The word ‘endorsing’ is a
place-holder for any of a variety of specifics, including believing, assuming,
accepting, recommending, and acting on; and, as indicated above, the word
‘position’ is the placeholder for any point of view taken towards a proposition,
understanding ‘proposition’ broadly. So a position may be: that a proposition
is true or plausible or probable, and so on; or that an action should be taken, a
policy pursued or endorsed, and so on; or that an attitude is appropriate or
justified, and so on.
       I think van Eemeren and Grootendorst are right to extend the Searlean
concept of an assertive beyond the expression of commitment to the truth or
falsity of a proposition to include, more broadly, the expression of any attitude
of positive or negative commitment towards a sentence, understanding
sentence to embrace not only factual sentences that are true or false, but also
normative sentences whose truth-value status may be problematic (1984: 95-
96). It might be fruitful to extend the concept of a proposition along similar lines,
and I use the word ‘proposition’ in such an extended way in this paper. (They
use the word ‘statement’ where I have written ‘sentence,’ but I take ‘statement’
to denote an asserted proposition, which is just what is at issue.) This view has
implications for Walton’s analysis of the speech act of presumption, discussed
below.
      As the word is used here, an argument is always someone’s argument, just
as a reason is someone’s reason. Sets of propositions that might serve as
reasons for endorsing a claim but that no one has proposed or accepted as
such are, in my terminology, only possible arguments. Thus the reasons
offered in arguments are asserted propositions, or “statements.” There is not a
parallel terminology for propositions that have been accepted or believed in
reasoning, but not expressed, but we might call them endorsed or assented-to
propositions. This is not the way Harman and others use ‘argument,’ to denote
exclusively a proof or implication relation (1986: 3-4), although proofs can be
used as, or found in, arguments.
      An argument can consist of more than one reason for accepting the
position. Why should someone ever offer more than one reason to support a
position? Here are some reasons:
 The arguer believes that the reason provides only weak support for the
position, and that the audience will agree, and he wishes to supply additional
support so that the total support provided by all the reasons he offers adds up
to strong support for the position.
 The arguer believes the audience might not accept the reason and he wishes
to supply another one as an alternative reason that the audience may use if it
does not accept the first one.
 The arguer believes the audience might not accept some part of the reason
and he wishes to supply a supplementary reason to persuade the audience to
accept that part of the initial reason.
 The arguer believes that although the audience might accept his reason, it
might also believe there is at least one detracting or refuting reason that
overrides his, and he wishes to supply a reason why the audience should
discount or reject the detracting or refuting reasons, or else should reject its
status as overriding the initial reason.
 2.2 Assumptions
      It is widely held that not all arguments are intended to be, nor (even with
premises added) are they plausibly reconstructed as, deductive or valid
arguments, that is, arguments in which the premises entail the conclusion in the
sense that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false
(although that view is not universally endorsed: see Groarke 1999).1But it is
not so widely held that all arguments are either deductive or
inductive.2However, Govier has made a decisive case against the
exhaustiveness of that dichotomy.
      Govier points out that if ‘inductive’ is defined as “non-deductive,” “[t]oo
many different types of argument will fall into the class, the result being that
saying an argument is in the broad sense inductive tells us essentially nothing
about it. It says only what the argument is not—not what it is” (1999, Ch. 10). If
induction is associated with empirical or scientific reasoning, as it has been,
then, Govier points out, even within that category there are several quite
different types of reasoning that need to be distinguished: inductive analogy,
inductive generalization (enumerative induction), non-disconfirmation,
experimental data to causal hypothesis, and abductive reasoning (ibid.). And
quite apart from failing to distinguish types of reasoning or argument used in
empirical or scientific thinking, this dichotomy leaves out both  a priori
analogical reasoning or arguments and also conductive reasoning or
arguments, each of which Govier persuasively defends as sui generis, and not
reducible to deductive reasoning or arguments (see 1999, Ch. 9 and Ch. 10,
respectively).
      Govier is not alone in holding that the categories of deductive and inductive
reasoning or argument are not exhaustive. We have seen that Scriven and
Walton would agree. In his discussion of presumptive reasoning, after
reviewing some examples of reasoning offered by Reiter (1987), Walton notes:
“The conclusion to be drawn from these cases then is that the understanding of
nonmonotonic reasoning is not to be sought in deductive or inductive formal
systems of inference, but in a more broadly pragmatic account . . .” (1996: 23).
Walton’s  Argument Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning is devoted to the
analysis of a number of patterns of inference or argument that fall outside the
deductive-inductive dichotomy (see Walton 1996: passim).
 
2.3 Motivation
      What motivates the present paper is a question that arises on the
assumption that Scriven, Govier, Walton and others who share their position
here are right. That question is simply this: What grounds such reasoning or
arguments? When the reasons don’t entail the position, or provide strong
quantitative inductive support for it, then how is one to be justified in accepting
it? What makes for “valid” or cogent reasoning or arguments belonging to this
Third Category? (By the way, we should not assume that this Third Category is
homogeneous. It may well be that there are major differences between types of
reasoning and arguments that are neither deductive nor inductive.)
      A way to see the gist of this question is to contrast deductive and inductive
reasoning and arguments with those of this Third Category. When the reasons
deployed in an episode of reasoning or in an argument entail the position, we
can see that on the assumption of those reasons it is rational to accept the
position because otherwise we face self-contradiction. The norm of strict,
logical consistency justifies reasoning and arguments of this sort. When an
accepted body of evidence provides strong inductive support for an empirical
position then, in very general terms, there is an analogous constraint of
consistency on our reasoning. A world in which the many and varied evidential
propositions that supply inductive support for an empirical position are true
(including the premise that conflicting evidence or hypotheses are unlikely), yet
the position is false, is a world in which (some of) our current empirical beliefs
or theories are incorrect. It is not an impossible world, but it is either
implausible or else less plausible than the world as we now know it. In that
sense, accepting the conclusion of such reasoning or such an argument is
being consistent with our other beliefs, and rejecting it is being inconsistent
with them. To be sure, the situation in particular instances of “inductive
reasoning” or “inductive argument” is more complex, but the assumption is that
as a general picture this account is roughly right. Now, the question being
posed here may be put this way. Is there some analogous kind of
inconsistency in accepting the reasons but rejecting the position allegedly
supported by them in reasoning or arguments belonging to the Third
Category? If so, what is it, and if not, then on what grounds is it rational to
accept the positions in Third Category reasoning or arguments? Anyone who
agrees that there are legitimate kinds of reasoning and argument that are not,
directly or indirectly, deductive or inductive, faces this question.
 
2.4 Link to reasoning/argument schemes
      In Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996), Walton
examines what he calls schemes for presumptive arguments or reasoning,
which he takes to be “normatively binding” in the sense that:
 If the hearer accepts the premises of the speaker’s argument, and the
argument is an instance of a genuine and appropriate argument scheme (for
the type of dialogue they are engaged in), then the hearer must or should (in
some binding way) accept the conclusion. This does not appear to be “validity”
in the same sense in which the word is familiarly used in deductive (or perhaps
even inductive) logic. But it does appear to express a normative or broadly
logical sense of validity, bindingness, conditional acceptability, or whatever you
want to call it. (10)
 Clearly Walton is here on the track of an answer to the question of this essay. If
we can get an understanding of what is a “genuine and appropriate” argument
scheme and of how such schemes constrain or bind their hearers (or users) to
accept their conclusions—having accepted their premises—then we have the
answer (or one answer) to our question. Thus it is that the question motivating
this inquiry leads to an examination of reasoning schemes.
  3. REASONING SCHEMES
      To start, we need to decide whether we should be speaking of  reasoning
(or inference) schemes, or of  argument (or argumentation) schemes. 
Kienpointner (1991) refers to them as argumentation schemata.3 Walton
(1996) switches back and forth between calling them argument (also
argumentation) schemes and inference schemes (or schemes for reasoning).
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst call them argumentation schemes. Following
the terminological conventions introduced above, the schemes are reasoning
schemes, for they are representations of  reasons, whether those reasons
function in a person’s own reasoning (inferences), or whether they are used in
an argument that the person presents to an audience.
      [Perhaps another clarification is needed. What is the difference between
argumentation and argument? These terms are widely used interchangably,
but also differently. Notice that Kienpointner uses the German word
‘Argument,’ where English-speaking philosophers might use the words
‘premise,’ ‘reason’ or evidence.’ Walton writes of listing “argumentation”
schemes (e.g.: “In this chapter, 25 different argumentation schemes are
described and analyzed” (46)), but he labels the schemes “argument from” this
or that: “Argument from Sign,” “Argument from Example,” and so on. At one
point, he writes, “Hastings (1963) identified argument from sign as a distinctive
argumentation scheme . . .” (47). Perhaps Walton is conceiving arguments as
units or components of argumentation, but there seems to be no consistent
usage. Consequently, we may conclude that the occurrences of  ‘argument’
and ‘argumentation’ in the literature indicate no settled and widely-accepted
technical conventions distinguishing their meanings, although I don’t claim that
no author differentiates them systematically.]
 3.1 What is a reasoning scheme?
      What is a reasoning scheme? It seems that everyone is expected to know
already, for although examples abound in the literature, clearcut analyses of the
concept are hard to come by. Walton (1996), Kienpointner (1992) and van
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) each draws attention to what is either a
slightly  different conception or to a different property of reasoning schemes.
However, from the three accounts, a single comprehensive conception can be
constructed.
      3.1.1 Three general accounts of reasoning schemes
      Walton quotes Hastings as calling argument schemes “modes of
reasoning” (1996: ix), and goes on to describe an “argumentation” scheme as
“a structure of inference” (ibid.). He says that argumentation schemes are
“certain common forms of argument” (ibid.: 1) and more precisely are “a
formal, pragmatic structure of arguments that is the counterpart to logical forms
of inference in semantics” (ibid.: x).
      Kienpointner (1992) says that by making a broad abstraction, all simple
normative or descriptive arguments can be reduced to a context-independent
basic scheme, which is a “prototype” in terms of which the context-specific
argumentation schemes of every argumentation can be distinguished (ibid.,
19:  “Schliesslich Könen durch wietere Abstraktionsshchritte alle einfachen
normativen oder deskriptiven Argumentationen auf ein kontextunabhäniges
Grundschema reduziert werden, das als ,,Prototype“ aller mehr oder weniger
kontextspezifischen Alrgumentationsshemata der Alltagsargumentation
angehsehen werden kann:”) That prototype is:
 
          Argument [evidence, grounds]---------------------> Konklusion [conclusion]
                                                                        |
                                                             |
                                                    Schlussregel [warrant, inference rule]
 
(Kienpointner acknowledges that he has borrowed the Toulmin model of
argument.)
      Van Eemeren and Grootendorst say an argumentation scheme is “a more
or less conventionalized way of representing the relation between what is
stated in the argument [the “reason”] and what is stated in the standpoint [the
“position”]” (1992: 96).
      Both Walton and van Eemeren and Grootendorst emphasize that
associated with any reasoning scheme is a set of “critical questions.” These
are questions that must be answered appropriately if any substitution instance
of a reasoning scheme is to be cogent. On neither account, though, is the
motivation of the questions associated with reasoning scheme given a general
explanation.
      What all these authors clearly have in mind is some general pattern of
argument or reasoning that has either been abstracted from particular cases or
can find instantiation in different particular cases, or both. In the terminology of
this essay, it is the pattern of the reason taken to support a position. It is an
abstract representation of an actual or a possible reason. What makes a
scheme an “abstraction” is that particular terms or phrases or propositions in
the statement of an actual reason are expressed by variables in the scheme’s
statement of it. What makes such a scheme normative is that there is some
justification for reasoning along its lines.
      3.1.2 One example: inferring from someone’s sayso
      All of this is suggestive, but it skirts the heart of the matter. In order to bring
out the essential nature of a reasoning scheme, it is instructive to use an
example as illustrative. Consider the reasoning involved in an appeal to some
source of information as the reason for accepting a position. The “appeal to
authority” and the “appeal to expert opinion” are variants of this reasoning. One
way to characterize this reasoning scheme is as follows, where ‘S’ represents
a person or persons (not always identified, as when ‘S’ denotes the authors of
a dictionary entry) and where ‘P’ represents a position:
  The “Appeal to a Source” reasoning scheme
      S asserts P.
     Normally, when S asserts P, P.
     So P (probably, plausibly).
      Can such reasoning ever be any good—or, more precisely, can substitution
instances of this reasoning scheme ever be any good? Certainly. Without
exaggeration, billions of examples of good reasoning that exhibits this pattern
are available. One will suffice.You ask your partner what time it is, and he/she
tells you that it’s around nine o’clock. His or her telling you that it is around nine
o’clock in answer to your question is an excellent reason to believe that it is
indeed around nine o’clock, other things being equal. Thus your reasoning, “It
is probably around nine o’clock because my partner tells me it is around nine
o’clock (and there is no reason to doubt him)” is excellent reasoning.
      A more interesting question than whether this reasoning is any good is the
question why it is reasonable for a reasoner R to believe P in circumstances C
because S says it is so. The answer seems to run along the following lines. It is
reasonable for R to believe P on S’s sayso in C just to the extent that there
exists in C a practice of truthfulness, at least between R and S. In many
societies there is a fairly widely practiced convention that you don’t assert a
proposition (that is, express it in a way that represents it as true), without
qualification, unless you believe it to be true and think you have good grounds
for your belief. It is that convention, insofar as R is justified in believing that it
applies to R and S in C, that makes it reasonable for R to accept P if S
asserts  that P, other things being equal. It is against that background that
someone’s saying that P is generally a good reason for accepting P.
      To be sure, like any social practice, truthfulness is complicated. For
instance, we make distinctions between fact and fiction: not all cases of saying
that P are cases of asserting that P. We also distinguish between facts (as in
observation reports) and opinions (as in judgement calls) Moreover, we
recognize that while such contrast pairs are useful, they are idealizations. We
teach our children the difference between inventions or “stories” and
descriptions or facts, and we wait until they are older to introduce them to the
unclear borderline cases, for example such questions as whether Farley
Mowat’s fictionalized account of the Barren-Land Inuit was in some sense true,
or whether a baseball umpire’s call expresses a description or a judgement.
(On the former, see Mowat’s People of the Deer. The book was taken at the
time to be a record of an historical event, the starvation of the Barren-Land
Innuit in northern Canada in the winter of 1948, but details of its narrative were
later shown to contain significant invention.) In addition, we understand that
there are special contexts in which truth-telling is highly qualified, as in certain
kinds of commercial marketplace bargaining, or in diplomatic exchanges
(affairs of state). And so on.
      There are two related reasons for a ceteris paribus qualification in the
“Appeal to a Source” reasoning scheme. First, S’s telling R that P is, in some
conditions, not a good reason for R to accept P, and second, it is impossible
to specify in any useful way (if at all) all those conditions. In general, there is an
exception to the scheme in circumstances when S might not be following the
truth-telling convention, or when S might be wrong about P.
      Notice that it is impossible to specify all the types of circumstances in which
these exceptions occur. There is an indefinite number of  kinds of situation in
which a person might be less than truthful, or might be innocently mistaken. So
there can be no algorithm for good “Appeal to a Source” reasoning.
Neverthless, since, in spite of its capacity for infinite variation, human conduct
and motivation tend to follow a limited number of well-defined paths, it is
possible to outline in a general way for any scheme the principal classes of
exceptions to it, and so to provide useful general, if not universal, guidelines for
the employment of that scheme. And that is the role of the so-called “critical
questions” associated with each reasoning scheme. They remind us of types
of circumstances that derail reasoning of the pattern represented by the
scheme. As Walton (1996) points out, the ceteris paribus feature of reasoning
schemes has the effect of placing reasoning according to them in the role of
the “default” in circumstances in which reasoning in that way is appropriate.
The critical questions function as a check-list to help determine whether any of
the standard types of excepting conditions that should cancel the default is
present in the given case.
      This last point can be illustrated using our example of the “Appeal to a
Source” scheme, as the following paragraphs illustrate in some detail.
      One general type of reason for cancelling the default in such reasoning is
that there are grounds for thinking that S might not be following the truth-telling
convention in the given case. That possibility motives the general critical
question, “Is there any reason not to trust S to be truthful on this occasion?” And
if it is useful to specify some of the circumstances that would justify questioning
S’s truthfulness, then more particular critical questions can be formulated, for
example: “Does S have any interest in not being truthful in this case?” And
conditions for such special circumstances can also be checked, for example:
“Will S gain monetarily by asserting P in this case although he does not believe
P is true?”
      Another general type of reason for cancelling the default in “P is true
because S says so”-reasoning is that there are grounds for thinking that S
might be wrong about P in this case. That possibility motivates the general
critical question, “Is S in a position to know that P on this occasion?” And as
with the previous general critical question, this one can also spawn more
particular questions that delve into ways in which S might fail to be in a position
to know that P on this occasion, such as, “Does S have the requisite
qualifications to know whether P is true?” and “Has S investigated whether P is
true?”
      Moreover, we can distinguish different types of S and P, according to
whether there is some reason to assign some of them a special status. In our
culture we have the role of  “expert” and the status of  “specialized knowledge.”
Specialized knowledge is information that is not capable of being known or
understood by anyone lacking expertise, and an expert is someone who has
the training and knowledge required to understand these otherwise
inaccessible matters. We assign epistemic privilege or authority to the expert
in matters of specialized knowledge within her perview. So if P belongs to a
specialized knowledge field (F), then “S says that P” is a reason to believe P
only if S is an expert in F, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, we can formulate
specialized critical questions to check whether a given P falls within a domain
of specialized knowledge, and if so whether a given S is an expert with respect
to that field. As fields of specialized knowledge have become more complex
and specializations of necessity have become narrower, we have altered our
critical questions to check for such factors: for example, “Is S an expert not only
in F in general, but more particularly in F , the part of F to which S belongs?”
We also recognize that expertise or epistemic authority comes in degrees: we
assign greater authority about cancer diagnoses to oncologists than to family
medicine physicians, for example.
      We know that experts no less than others can violate the trust put in them,
and can claim to know things that they have no better access to than anyone
else (as when physicians give advice in moral matters, for example) or claim
certainty when there are grounds for doubt (as when a physician presents a
diagnosis to the patient categorically, when she should  know that it is
controversial and so her diagnosis should be qualified). Accordingly, we
formulate additional critical questions to check out such possibilities, to see
whether an expert appealed to undermines her authority in these ways, thus
weaking the support of “S says that P” for P in F.
      We do not surrender our epistemic authority to experts completely. If an
expert makes a pronouncement, P, that strikes us as goofy (utterly
implausible), we are inclined to reject P, no matter what the expert’s
qualifications. If your dentist tells you he sees tiny people cavorting among your
molars, you don’t ask for a mirror so you can see them too. So we formulate
critical questions to remind ourselves to check the plausibility of P
independently of any credibility it receives by virtue of S’s having asserted it in
C. Moreover, nothing in principle prevents the plausibility of the position in
question from conflicting with the credibility of the source who asserts it,
requiring a balance-of-considerations judgement about the relative
acceptability of P.
      As noted above, we can’t make perfect lists of critical questions, because
situations differ in unpredictable ways (so no exhaustive list of all the
possibilities is possible), but also because different situations may call up
factors that don’t apply universally. If P is accessible only to those with
advanced scientific training (e.g., “Will the weight of the new engines increase
metal fatigue dangerously?”), then S has to have properties that pertain—have
the advanced scientific training, have done or studied the research bearing on
P, and so on. But if P is accessible only to those with personal experience
(e.g., “What’s it like to give birth?”), then S has to have had personal
experience of P, which may require no training whatever. Disagreements
among experts will raise questions about some Ps, as when physicians
consulted for a diagnosis of a set of symptoms disagree. But in other cases,
disagreements among those who are knowledgable is irrelevant, as when
movie critics disagree about whether a certain movie is good, but the
particular critic whose taste and values you have found invariably to coincide
with your own makes an unequivocal thumbs up or thumbs down judgement.
      Another reason we can’t make perfect lists is that the degree to which a
condition is met or not met can be signficant. So, perhaps the experts
disagree, but most of those with big reputations line up behind P and for
present purposes that’s good enough for you to go with P. Or perhaps there is
some general reason to question S’s reliability (e.g., S is getting paid for her
opinion), yet on this occasion there is also reason to think that S’s integrity with
respect to P is not in any doubt. It’s a judgement call, and no set of conditions
specifying all the factors and how to weight them that applies in all cases can
usefully be set out.
      Yet another variable that prevents formulating complete checklists is that
the degree of confidence in the position that is needed will vary. When life-or-
death information is needed, then confidence approaching certainty is
desireable in a source. When convenience is important, and it doesn’t matter
much whether the position is slightly wrong, then it might be perfectly adequate
to accept a P in an area of specialized knowledge on the advice of an S who is
only slightly more knowledgeable than oneself.
      A final complication is that, even assuming no conflict between the
plausibility of P and the credibility of S,  the various factors can conflict in
particular situations in which judgement about P is required. Perhaps a life-or-
death decision must be made, which calls for certainty, but one has only a few
minutes in which to make it (as can happen in hospital emergency wards),
which calls for a quick-and-dirty judgement. The need for practicality and the
need for certainty conflict in such cases, and that affects the conditions of
reasonable reliance on a source in those situations. A different kind of
example: perhaps most authorities agree that P, yet one eminent authority,
who has a track-record for astute, minority judgements, dissents.
      3.1.3 Generalizations from the first example
      We have seen that in the case of reasoning to the truth of information on the
basis of the sayso of some source it gains its rationality from the social
practice of truthfulness. This practice at the same time justifies our reliance on
sources for information, and alerts us to various limits on that reliance. Our
recognition of those limits inspires a check-list of the common sorts of
excepting circumstances. If this case is at all typical, we can in general expect
to find some such particular ground for relying on the reasoning pattern
captured by any reasoning scheme. As well, we should not expect that reliance
to be justified unconditionally. For any given reasoning scheme there will be
exceptions, and to the extent that the exceptions can be classified, we can
generate a check-list of critical questions to guide anyone using the reasoning
scheme in question.
      We have also seen that, for a number of reasons, it is not possible to
provide a single, simple, universally applicable list of specific critical questions
for a reasoning scheme. The attempt to provide a complete set of specialized
sets of critical questions for each type of occasion in which a scheme might be
used, while it might be interesting, would result in a welter of question-sets, with
unavoidably problematic splitting of closely related by slightly different contexts,
and much overlapping. The result would have dubious practical value. Thus, the
criterion of selection for critical questions is their usefulness for the purpose at
hand. Accordingly, not only is there room for reasonable disagreement about
any given set of critical questions, given that means-ends judgements are in
principle contestable, but also there may be different sets of critical questions
for any given reasoning scheme, each for its own purpose.
      In other words, the critical questions associated with a reasoning scheme
are generated by knowledge of the types of circumstances in which there are
exceptions to what is normally good reasoning. What makes the reasoning
good in the normal or default situation is what might be called the warranting
condition of that kind of reasoning. In the case of reasoning based on
information provided by a source, the proposal made here is that the
warranting condition is the existence of the social practice of truthfulness. That
is what justifies the reasoning. In some loose sense of entailment, we might
say that the the practice of truthfulness entails P for R in C when S tells R that P
in C, other things being equal. We will see that the warranting condition is what
justifies the warrant that functions in the reasoning scheme.
      The suggestion is that the rationality of reasoning schemes is a local, or
individual matter. Each normative scheme will have its own warranting
condition. (Thus “different” schemes that have the same warranting condition
should turn out to be varieties of the same generic scheme.) This contention
can only be justified inductively, but the discussion of the scheme for reasoning
from information from a source is a start. In order to strengthen the case, I will
next show how these generalizations apply to some other reasoning schemes.
       3.1.4 Another example: reasoning from a priori analogy
      When reasoning from analogy is good reasoning, why is it good
reasoning? We quickly notice that there is both normative and empirical
reasoning from analogy: sometimes we draw conclusions about what is right or
wrong, what ought or ought not to be done, what is good or bad, or how
something ought to be understood, on the basis of analogies, and sometimes
we draw conclusions about what is probably in fact the case on the basis of
analogies (and in the latter case, sometimes our conclusions are general and
sometimes they are particular). Consider for present purposes only the first
kind of case, labelled by Govier a priori reasoning from analogy. 
      One convicted sexual offender gets a four-year jail sentence, another gets a
one year jail sentence. It is argued that the penalty of the second is unjust, or
that the penality of at least one of them is unjust. The reason given for the
complaint of injustice is that both offenders were convicted of the same crime,
and the nature of their respective offences was similar. Was the judge in the
second case wrong—was his reasoning bad?  The judge in the second case
says that the sentence is lighter than usual because the second offender, unlike
the first, is very old and ill. Presumably the judge is reasoning that the effect of
the punishment on the offender should be similar in similar cases, and that the
effect of a one-year sentence on the aged and ill offender will be similar to the
effect of a four-year sentence on a younger offender. Was the judge in the
second case right—was his reasoning good after all?
      What seems to underly a priori analogical reasoning is the principle that
similar cases should be treated, or conceived, similarly, or in other words, the
assumption of the rationality of consistency. If two cases are similar in the
respects relevant to the kind of judgement being made about them, and there
are no particular reasons in the circumstances for distinguishing them, then to
make a particular judgement of one but not the other is inconsistent or
arbitrary. What counts as consistent treatment is a judgement call, given real-
world complexities such as the differences between the convicted offenders in
the kind of case alluded to above. Moreover consistency is not the only value
there is, so whether it should be overridden in a particular case is also a
judgement call. Still, consistency is an avatar of rationality, and reasoning
based on it is prima facie good reasoning. We might call consistency the
“warranting condition” of a priori reasoning from analogy.
      3.1.5 Additional examples
      It should be possible, if the thesis being developed here is true, to supply
the warranting condition for any reasoning scheme that has substitution
instances that count as good reasoning. Walton (1996) lists twenty-five of what
he terms “the” argument schemes. Although there are problems with his
formulations (for example, some are entailments, as stated) Walton’s list
provides a good sample for testing our thesis. But rather than discuss all
twenty-five schemes in detail, one by one, it will be more efficient to comment
briefly on the generic warranting conditions that recur in the reasoning
schemes that Walton describes.
      One of these warranting conditions might be called the implication of a
convention or practice, and it is found in Walton’s schemes labelled “argument
from a position to know” and “argument from expert opinion.” Both of these are
special cases of reasoning from information provided by a source, and we
have already discussed how that scheme relies on the convention of
truthfulness. The general idea is that, given the existence of a certain social
convention or practice, one is justified in normally expecting conduct of a
certain sort when that practice is in play, for that is what it means for the
practice to be operative.
      A second generic warranting condition is consistency. For example, in
Walton’s “argument from commitment”—reasoning that someone should do
something by virtue of some commitment they have made—the appeal seems
to be to acting in a way that is consistent with that commitment.  (Or, perhaps
the argument from commitment is another case of relying on a social
convention, that of promising. One could also see classify this reasoning as
employing a sort of ceteris paribus class or quantificational logic, for it takes
the following form: “All those who have a committment to X should, ceteris
paribus, do A; you have made a commitment to X; so you should do A.”) A
special case of the argument from commitment is the “argument from
established rule,” since it appeals to a rule to justify a judgement, and such an
appeal has force only if the person to whom the judgement applies has a
commitment to following or obeying that rule in general. The “argument from
verbal classification”—for example, one of my late father’s standard rejoinders,
“That policy is unacceptable: it’s pure socialism!”—seems similarly to employ
consistency as its warranting condition: consistency with the classification in
question implies assigning the property mentioned. And it too can be modelled
by a kind of ceteris paribus class or quantificational logic: “This A may be
classified as an X, X’s normally have property Z, so this A has property Z.”
Walton’s “argument from consequences” scheme is a kind of causal-cum-
normative reductio ad absurdum reasoning. The reasoning is that a given act
or policy will have bad consequences and so shouldn’t be done or
implemented. The consequence is not a logical one but a causal one, and its
“absurdity” consists not of contradiction, but of undesireableness. But again,
what warrants the reasoning is an appeal to consistency, this time between
espoused values and the consequences of actions. A special case of the
argument from consequences scheme is the “argument from causal slippery
slope.” This is the reasoning that taking a first step will cause a second, which
will cause a third, and so on until a final consequence that is undesirable is
reached, and therefore refraining from taking the first step is justified. Another
special case of the appeal to consequences reasoning is what Walton labels
the “argument from waste,” which is the reasoning that because a large
investment towards reaching an uncertain outcome has been made to date,
and because that investment would be wasted if the efforts were broken off, the
pursuit of that outcome should be continued. In both the causal slippery slope
argument and the argument from waste the appeal is to act consistently with
(the implications of) one’s values.
      Another of Walton’s schemes belonging to the group relying on consistency
as the warranting rationale is reasoning from analogy, discussed in detail
above. Reasoning from analogy is itself  a generic reasoning scheme. The
“argument from precedent” and its variant, the “precedent slippery slope
argument” both appeal to analogies in their reasoning and so too rely on
consistency as their warranting condition.
      A category of reasoning schemes that appeals to consistency in another
way takes the form of reasoning to an explanation. Both Walton’s “argument
from evidence to a hypothesis” and “argument from a correlation to a cause”
have this feature. When we reason in these ways we are seeking order in the
world we experience—either to find it or to impose it. Why? Maybe there is
order that manifests itself to us. Maybe there is some survival instinct that
causes us to construct an order, since order permits predictions. These are
deep and difficult questions, but whatever their answers, the order-
seeking/finding of this reasoning is undeniable, and what we seek is an
account that is consistent with both the new data and what we already believe.
      A half-dozen of Walton’s reasoning schemes rely in one way or another on
spelling out the causal implications of causal generalizations in particular
circumstances. The “argument from cause to effect” is the generic scheme of
this group.The warrant of such reasoning is a causal generalization, and the
warranting condition is the nature of causality as we understand it. Given that
events of type A cause events of type B, the occurrence of a particular A
justifies inferring the occurrence of a particular B, ceteris paribus. The
“argument from sign” might be called the argument from effect to cause. It is
reasoning from something that is a sign of a thing to the presence of the thing
itself, and assumes a causal relation between the sign and the thing signified.
Walton’s example—there are bear tracks, so there’s a bear—assumes (safely
enough) that bears normally are the cause of bear tracks. The “circumstantial
argument against the person” is a variation, for it involves reasoning from a
generalization that one type of property (say, inconsistency between preaching
and practice) is causally associated with another (say, the unreliability of
what’s preached). The “argument from popularity” is reasoning from the fact
that a position is widely held to the conclusion that it is plausible. This would
appear to be a special case of reasoning from a source, with the credibility of
the source being taken to lie not in an individual’s trustworthiness or expertise,
but in the strength of numbers. However, it is more likely that underlying this
reasoning is the assumption of a causal relation between a position’s being
widely accepted and its being true, ceteris paribus—the assumption that error
would not survive the scrutiny of so many. The “ethotic argument,” that
someone’s good character is vouchsafe for the truth of her pronouncements,
relies on assuming a general causal relation between character and credibility.
The “argument from bias” is one inverse of the ethotic argument, involving as it
does reasoning that bias undermines crediblity, thus relying similarly on a
general causal claim. All of these variaties of inferring a particular causal
implication of a general causal claim share the general assumption of the
rationality of our causal understanding.
      I have left to the end a couple of examples that seem to rely on an analogue
of the logical principle of modus tollens exported to the non-deductive world.
What Walton calls the “argument from vagueness of verbal classification” is
reasoning that because a verbal classification is too vague, no particular
application of it can be made. One of his examples is the argument that the
point at which a fetus becomes a human person cannot be used as the
dividing line between permissible and impermissible abortion, because that
“point” is too vague. In general the reasoning seems to be that for a judgement
or decision to rely on a degree of precision, such precision must be possible;
but in the given case such precision is not possible; so the judgement or
decision cannot rely on that kind of precision in the given case. Walton’s
“argument from arbitrariness of a verbal classification” is similar. For a
judgement to rely on a non-arbitrary verbal classification, such non-arbitrary
classifications must be possible, but in the given case such a non-arbitrary
classificiation is not possible, so in the given case such the judgement cannot
rely on such a classification. Both of these are cases of qualified modus
tollens reasoning (if p then q; but not q; so not p)—qualified, because unlike
modus tollens proper, each of them includes a ceteris paribus clause. The
warranting condition of these reasoning schemes is the rationality of the
idealized entailment.
      So much for the abbreviated treatment of Walton’s particular argumentation
schemes, most of which have been discussed. Admittedly the argument is
sketchy, but what it suggests is that there is a relatively small number of types
of rationale for reasoning in these various ways, which may or may not reduce
to one or another aspect of consistency, but which really do justify such
reasoning when all things are equal, but which don’t justify it universally, since
frequently other things are not equal and so an exception must be made.
      3.1.6 Recapitulation
      We can now see what Hastings meant by calling schemes “modes of
reasoning.” More precisely, a reasoning scheme represents a particular way or
manner of reasoning. We can see what Walton meant by describing them as
structures of argument (we would say, of “reasoning”). A reasoning scheme
sets out the pattern that is instantiated in particular substitution instances of
reasoning or argument. We can see why Kienpointner takes the Toulmin model
to capture the prototype or most general type of structure of a reasoning
warrant. Each of these modes of reasoning is distinguished by the ceteris
paribus (Walton’s “pragmatic”) principle that authorizes or warrants inferring a
particular conclusion from a particular configuration of grounds or evidence.
(There is no objection to including the warrant as a component of the scheme
that parallels the objection to including the associated conditional of an
argument as a premise in the reconstructed argument—that it opens the door
to a vicious infinite regress. For a scheme is not an argument or an argument
form, and the warrant is not an associated conditional.) The warrant of a
scheme derives from the particular conditions or features that make an
inference of that type rational, when there are no circumstances that require
making an exception and cancelling the default. And finally, we can see why
van Eemeren and Grootendorst focussed on a very small number (three) of
“categories” of schemes, while acknowledging that “[o]f course, there are many
subcategories of argumentation schemes” (1992: 97). Walton’s list of 25
turned out to contain a quite small number of subsets, each of which could be
distinguished by being a variation of a single general warranting principle. And
van Eemeren and Grootendorst are also right to use the evaluative function of
reasoning schemes as their principle of classification: “Each type of
argumentation corresponds to certain assessment criteria that pertain to the
relation represented in the argumentation scheme” (1992: 98). This is another
way of using the warrants used in reasoning schemes as the basis of their
classification, and recognizes the central role of these inference licenses in the
conception of a reasoning scheme.
      Not everything in these three accounts should find its way into in a general
theory of reasoning schemes.
 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s “category” of reasoning that something is
symptomatic of something else is itself a special case of applying a causal
generalization (as we saw above in discussing Walton’s “argument from a
sign”), and so is not as general a category as they take it to be. Also, there
appear to be more than three basic categories of reasoning schemes (though,
to be fair, van Emeren and Grootendorst do not explicitly claim there are only
the three they describe).
 Walton’s qualification that this sort of reasoning is “provisional” and  “inherently
tentative” (1996: xi, 42) conflates defeasability with insecurity. Given that none
of the excepting conditions applies, a presumption in favour of a position can
be so secure that it would be irrational to deny the position. If you make a
promise, then if no excepting conditions apply, you ought to keep your promise
—not provisionally, or tentatively, but most definitely—all the while
acknowledging that there might be some factor you have overlooked, or some
new factor that will change the picture. The falsifiability of scientific claims does
not prevent us from being (with justification) morally certain about some of
them, and the defeasibility of the conclusions of reasoning using schemes
similarly justifies moral certainty about them, when the appropriate conditions
are met.
 One of Walton’s chapter titles, “The Argumentation Schemes” (1996: 46),
conveys the unfortunate suggestion that there is a definite number of reasoning
schemes. We have seen that this cannot be so, since it is possible to parse
reasoning at various levels of generality, and the specification, and count, of
reasoning schemes will vary accordingly.
 3.2 The general theory of reasoning schemes
      A complete account of reasoning schemes has to solve a number of
problems. One is the individuation problem: what consitutes a single scheme?
When there is a long sequence of reasoning, or a complicated argument, are
there many schemes linked together, or just one scheme? Can there be more
and less complex schemes, or simple and compound or single and multiple
schemes? A second is the identification problem: what determines whether a
scheme is the correct scheme of a reason? A third is the classification
problem: how many schemes are there and how are they related to one
another? A fourth is the evaluation problem: how is it decided that the reason
that instantiates a given scheme is cogent?
      The account above has already supplied solutions to the classification and
the evaluation problems. Systems of classification are relative to their
purposes. Consequently, there can be no “correct” typology of reasoning
schemes. The only pertinent question is whether any particular classification
successfully or optimally fulfills its purpose. And what makes an instantiation of
a given scheme cogent is that the warrant of the reasoning is rational and none
of the excepting conditions applies in that case. We have seen that there is no
single or universal principle of  rationality for such reasoning, that the
warranting conditions apply only for the most part or ceteris paribus, and we
have also seen that the excepting conditions are highly context sensitive. In the
remainder of the paper I take up the individuation and the identification
problems.
 
     3.2.1 The individuation problem: how many?
      What is the scope of a reasoning scheme? In the literature on schemes the
focus has been on small units. Kienpointner’s prototype includes a set of data
(which presumably can be expressed by a set consisting of more than one
sentence) and a warrant that authorizes the drawing of a single conclusion or
“claim” directly from that data set. Walton’s examples contain a small number
of premises (or premise types) which together are supposed to provide direct
presumptive support for a conclusion (or conclusion type). Here is an example,
a slight modification of Walton’s account of the (scheme of the) “argument from
popular practice” (1996: 84):
 If a large majority (everyone, or nearly everyone, etc.) does A, or acts as
though A is the right (or an acceptable) thing to do, then there is a presumption
that A is a prudent course of action.
     A large majority acts as though A is the right thing to do.
     Therefore, A is a prudent course of action.
      By defining schemes as reasonining schemes, and by defining a reason as
a  unit of support for a position, we solve the invidividuation problem in short
order. A scheme will be the scheme of a reason, and a reason is the smallest
self-standing unit of support for a position. Thus, what are in Freeman’s (and
others’) terminology, “convergent” and “serial” arguments will necessarily
exhibit two or more reasoning schemes (1991: Ch. 8). In the case of a
convergent argument, each branch of argument supporting the conclusion will
instantiate (be a substitution instance of) a separate token of a scheme
(although they could, coincidentally, all happen to be instantiations or tokens of
a single scheme—all arguments from analogy, for example); and in the case of
a serial argument, each step in the chain of arguments will instantiate a
separate token of a scheme (again, possibly tokens of the same scheme). In
terms of Snoeck Henkeman’s (1992) analysis of both cumulative and
complementary arguments, there will be more than one scheme at work. She
takes each “premise” in such arguments to represent a reason for a different
claim. For example, for the argument that might be stated:
 I think she’s in love with him because she blushes every time he starts
speaking to her and she also keeps talking about him.
 she takes the correct analysis to be as follows [I have supplied the numbering]
(1992: 96):
      A [arguer] (1) I think she’s in love with him.
     B [actual or anticipated audience] (2) Why do you thinks so?
     A (3) She blushes every time he starts speaking to her.
     B (4) Well, that doesn’t necessarily mean that she’s in love with him.
     A (5) No, but she also keeps talking about him.
 In the present terminology, A offers (3) as a reason for (1),  and subsequently
A offers (5) as a reason for (1). So there are two schemes in play here,
possibly both of the same type.
      Freeman (1991: Ch. 8) makes a good case for counting convergent and
serial arguments as single arguments, and his reasoning would apply equally
to what Snoeck Henkemans calls cumulative and complementary arguments. If 
Freeman is right, a single argument may exhibit several schemes. His point
gives us another reason for identifying schemes with reasons and  not with
arguments.
      3.2.2 The identification problem: which one?
      A scheme can be more or less abstract, depending on how much of the
statement of the reasoning or the argument that it represents is expressed by
variables and on how large are the units of the argument expressed by a single
variable. Thus one reason can be expressed by more than one variation of a
scheme, the variations being a function of the variations in their type or degree
of abstraction from the reason.
      In the literature, sometimes actual reasoning or an argument is quoted and
a scheme is formulated that is purported to be the scheme of that reasoning or
argument. Let us call such schemes “descriptive,” since they are purported to
describe accurately the patterns of particular reasons people have actually
used or might use. The reasons so portrayed may or may not in fact be cogent,
so there can be correct descriptive schemes of bad or fallacious reasoning or
arguments. Such schemes are “correct” just in case they accurately portray the
pattern of the reasons in question. Sometimes in the literature schemes are
formulated and proposed as patterns of cogent reasoning or argument. Let us
call such schemes “cogent” just in case they portray patterns of reasons which
can have instantiations that are cogent. It might be debatable whether a
particular scheme is in fact cogent in this sense. A particular scheme may be
both descriptive and cogent; that is, it may accurately capture the pattern of a
particular reason, and such a reason might also be cogent. The identification
problem applies to descriptive schemes; the question of whether a scheme is
cogent constitutes the evaluation problem.
      By the way, to forestall a possible confusion, it is important to distinguish
between the type of scheme and the type of reasoning or argument. Let us call
an instance of reasoning or argument “empirical” if its conclusion is an
empirical, factual or descriptive sentence or proposition, and let us call it
“normative” if its conclusion is a presciption or a commendation. Any argument
of either type will exhibit at least one descriptive scheme, and presumably
there can be cogent schemes for reasoning or arguments of both types. This
distinction corresponds to Kienpointner’s distinction between schemes for
“deskriptive Propositionen” and “normative Propositionen” (1992: 166, but
also passim).
      There are often several possible formulations of the scheme of a particular
episode of reasoning. For example, the following reasoning might be
represented by any one of the schemes listed below it:
 I guess my car keys are in the pocket of my coat in the closet at home
because I don’t have them with me and I think that’s the only other place they
could be. 
     (S1)   If an object is probably located in the pocket of my coat in the closet at
home or on my person,  and it is not in one, it is probably in the other.
               Object X is located either in that coat pocket or on my person.
               Object X is not on my person
               So,
               Object X is probably in the pocket of my coat in the closet at home. 
     (S2)          If an object is probably located in location A or in B, and it
is not in one, it is probably in the other.
               Object X is located either in location A or in location B.
               Object X is not in location A.
               So,
               Object X is probably in location B. 
     (S3)   If an object probably has property   or property  , then if it does not
have one, it probably has the other.
               Object X has property  A or property B .
               Object X does not have property  A.
               So,
               Object X probably has property B  
     (S4)   (disjunctive syllogism) 
               Either p or q.
               Not p.
               So,
               q.
 
     We can think of schemes as reason-types, and substitution instances of
schemes as reason tokens. What counts as the correct schematic
interpretation of a reason token may be a matter of debate. Any token of
reasoning or argument will represent at least one descriptive scheme, but
whether a particular descriptive scheme accurately portrays a given reason
token may be debatable. On what grounds are such disagreements to be
settled?
          Consider an example. Walton (1996: 83) gives an example of what he
calls the argument from popularity:
 Nearly everyone who lives in Cedar Rapids thinks that the lake is a good
place to swim in the summer. Therefore, the lake in Cedar Rapids is probably
(plausibly) a good place to swim in the summer.
 And he offers the following as the “argumentation scheme” for the argument
from popularity (ibid.):
 If a large majority (everyone, nearly everyone, etc.) accept A as true, than there
exists a (defeasable ) presumption in favour of A.
A large majority accept A as true.
Therefore, there exists a presumption in favour of A.
 “This kind of argumentation,” Walton says, “is deductively invalid, and
generally it is not highly reliable” (ibid.). But as Walton has formulated it, any
substitution instance of this scheme will be deductively valid, for it will have the
form of modus ponens. Since Walton is here interested in schemes for
presumptive reasoning, which he understands explicitly as not deductive
reasoning, it looks as though his formulation of the scheme for “argument from
popularity” is a slip-up—not what he intended. The scheme for the reasoning
used in this type of argument must reflect the type of reasoning it is, or may
most plausibly be taken to be. We might try the following: 
(1) If everyone or nearly everyone who has an opinion about it believes p is
true, then there is a presumption in favour of p’s being true, and (2) just
about everyone who has an opinion about it does believe p to be true.
     So, in the absence of reasons to the contrary,
     (3) p may be taken to be true. 
In this formulation, substitution instances of (1) and (2) do not entail the
corresponding substitution instance of (3). 
     If we may generalize from this example, one constraint on, or rule for, the
formulation of a descriptive reasoning scheme would be that it should
accurately represent the kind of reasoning that it purports to be. To be sure, it
is not always possible to know what kind of reasoning the reasoner or arguer
intended, and in situations in which that intent cannot be determined there is no
way to decide with certainty what the correct formulation of the descriptive
reasoning scheme is. At this point general principles of interpretation such as
Charity must be applied.
      We can use Walton’s example to illustrate another constraint or rule.
Suppose someone offered the following as the reasoning scheme of Walton’s
Cedar Rapids example of an argument from popularity. 
     If p, then presumptively q.
     p.
     So, presumptively,
     q.
 In this case, the problem is that by supplying a variable for the entire
antecedent, the proposed scheme (qualified modus ponens) abstracts too
much, removing from view properties of the reasoning that are essential to its
particular nature. It is like an arial photograph taken from too high up, or without
sufficient resolution, to reveal the topographical features of interest to its
viewers. We can thus make a rule that a scheme must exhibit the particular
warrant of the reasoning: the properties of the reasoning that are salient to its
(alleged) cogency. The implication is not, by the way, that modus ponens is
never the appropriate focus; the point is that it fails to exhibit perspicuously the
warrant of the reasoning employed in the argument from popularity.
      It may be that it is a tacit recognition of this rule—a concern with exhibiting
the feature of the reasoning salient to its cogency—that leads Kienpointner
(1992: 19ff.) to adopt the Toulmin model as  the “prototype” of all argument
schemes. In the Toulmin model, the “warrant” is the statement of the “principle”
by virtue of which the “backing” information may be taken as support for the
“claim” (Toulmin, 1958). Thus the warrant makes explicit why the inference of
the claim from the backing is supposedly justified. (In my terminology, both
“backing” and “warrant” are parts of a reason for a position.)
      To sum up, a descriptive scheme of an instance of reasoning should satisfy
at least two requirements: 
(a) the scheme should accurately represent the kind of reasoning intended
by the reasoner or arguer; 
(b) the scheme should perspicuously exhibit the features of the reasoning
that are salient to its (alleged) cogency.
 4. CONCLUSION
      If the argument of this paper is correct, the theory of normative reasoning
schemes constitutes at least one part of the theory of probative reasoning—
reasoning the inferences of which are neither deductively valid nor
quantitatively inductively strong, yet which, nonetheless, can be cogent.
Normative reasoning schemes capture the structure of such reasoning,
including its warrants, and thereby display how such inferences are rational,
even though they are not logical entailments and not scientific inductions. This
rationality is not left to “intuition,” but in each case can be traced to a particular
way in which rationality is manifest. The application of normative reasoning
schemes requires an understanding of these local manifestations of rationality,
often in considerable specific detail. For such rationality is highly contextual,
and the conditions of its exercise are accordingly specific to those contexts.
These conditions are monitored by the so-called critical questions that
theorists have associated with reasoning schemes, and these critical
questions thus play an integral role in the application of these schemes.
      To the extent that the informal fallacies are associated with normative
reasoning schemes, as Walton (1996) makes a plausible case that they are,
we can understand how the study of fallacies has occupied such a central role
in informal logic scholarship. Walton argues that the informal fallacies are
essentially related to abuses or improper uses of reasoning schemes in
reasoning or argument. But reasoning schemes supply the rationale for the
Third Category of reasoning and argument, and the field of informal logic is
centrally concerned to understand the rationale of non-formal reasoning—more
precisely, reasoning the inferences of which are not deductive entailments.
Hence it is entirely appropriate that the attempt to understand informal fallacies
has been a preoccupation of informal logic.
      If this paper is on the right track, it does not bring an end to the inquiry, but
rather opens the door to further work. The specific rationales of particular types
of reasoning scheme have been scarcely more than suggested, and in each
case require much more thorough investigation. If the suggested general
rationale for critical questions is correct, then it is likely that it will be possible
and useful to work out a heuristic for the formulation of critical questions. The
pedagogy of reasoning schemes also would need to be addressed, since
some simplifications might be needed for teaching purposes, especially at the
introductory level. The tasks of producing elegant and perspicuous
formulations of the most commonly used reasoning schemes and of giving a
correct account of the different types of generic schemes remain to be taken
up. And last but not least, the theoretical question of whether so-called
inductive reasoning is sui generis, or whether it should be considered to
constitute another family of presumptive reasoning schemes, is worth
considering. It might turn out that there are not three broad Categories of
reasoning, but just two after all: not deductive and inductive, but deductive and
non-deductive, with inductive or empirical reasoning being one sub-class of the
latter.
ENDNOTES
1I use ‘valid’ and ‘entail’ in the way they are widely used in textbooks in formal,
symbolic or deductive logic. See Copi’s account of validity (1967: 20-21);
Kalish and Montague’s characterization of a valid argument (1964: 14);
Leblanc and Wisdom’s account of entailment (1976: 5); Georgakarakos and
Smith’s account of entailment (1979: 9-11); Carney and Scheer’s definition of
‘valid argument’ (1980: 12); Lambert and Ulrich’s definition of a ‘valid
argument’ (1980: 16); Jeffrey’s definition of ‘valid inference’(1981: 1).
 
2See Lambert and Ulrich (1980: 4) for a typical expression of the prevailing
view: “If a piece of reasoning is not deductive, but nevertheless intended to
provide some evidence for the conclusion, then it is said to be inductive
reasoning, and the argument that represents it is an inductive argument.” See
also Skyrms (1966).
3In referring to Kienpointner, I must make a confession. His 1992 book,
Alltagslogik, Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern, has as yet
not been translated into English, and my reading knowledge of German is
woefully deficient. So I have not been able to read more than bits of this book,
and it may be that Kienpointer has anticipated many or all of the points made
in this paper. My only excuse for forging ahead without taking the time to
master German sufficiently to read Kienpointner’s book is that these points
have not yet been adequately addressed in English, and if my account simply
repeats points Kienpointer has already made, well, perhaps that gives them a
degree of independent confirmation.
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